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Abstract
According to decision making theory, if we know the user’s utility
Ui = U (si ) of all possible alternatives si , then we can uniquely predict
the user’s preferences. In practice, we often only know approximate values
Vi ≈ Ui of the user’s utilities. Based on these approximate values, we
can only make probabilistic predictions of the user’s preferences. It is
empirically known that in many real-life situations, the corresponding
probabilities are described by a logit model, in which the probability pi
eβ·Vi
of selecting the alternative si is equal to pi = n
P β·V . There exist
e j
j=1

many theoretical explanations of this empirical formula, some of these
explanations led to a 2001 Nobel prize. However, it is known that the
logit formula is empirically valid even when the assumptions behind the
existing justifications do not hold. To cover such empirical situations, it
is therefore desirable to provide a new distribution-free justification of the
logit formula. Such a justification is provided in this paper.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Traditional approach to decision making. In decision making theory, it
is proven that under certain reasonable assumption, a person’s preferences are
defined by his or her utility function U (x) which assigns to each possible outcome

1

x a real number U (x) called utility; see, e.g., Keeney and Raiffa [5], Raiffa
[10]. In many real-life situations, a person’s choice s does not determine the
outcome uniquely, we may have different outcomes x1 , . . . , xn with probabilities,
correspondingly, p1 , . . . , pn .
For example, drivers usually select the path with the shortest travel time.
However, when a driver selects a path s, the travel time is often not uniquely
determined: we may have different travel times x1 , . . . , xn with corresponding
probabilities p1 , . . . , pn .
For such a choice, we can describe the utility U (s) associated with this
choice as the expected value of the utility of outcomes: U (s) = E[U (x)] =
p1 · U (x1 ) + . . . + pn · U (xn ). Among several possible choices, a user selects
the one for which the utility is the largest: a possible choice s is preferred to a
possible choice s0 (denoted s > s0 ) if and only if U (s) > U (s0 ).
It is important to mention that the utility function is not uniquely determined by the preference relation. Namely, for every two real numbers a > 0
def
and b, if we replace the original utility function U (x) with the new one U 0 (x) =
a · U (x) + b, then for each choice s, we will have
U 0 (s) = E[a · U (x) + b] = a · E[U (x)] + b = a · U (s) + b
and thus, U 0 (s) > U 0 (s0 ) if and only if U (s) > U (s0 ).
Situations in which we can only predict probabilities of different decision. One important application of decision making theory is predicting the
user decisions. If we know the exact values U (s) of the utilities, then we can predict the exact choice. For example, if the user has to choose between alternatives
s and s0 , then the user chooses s if U (s) ≥ U (s0 ) and s0 if U (s) ≤ U (s0 ).
In practice, we do not know the exact values U (s) of the user’s utility, we
only know the approximate values V (s) ≈ U (s). Due to the difference between
the observed (approximate) values V (s) and the actual (unknown) values U (s),
we are no longer able to uniquely predict the user’s behavior: e.g., even when
V (s) > V (s0 ), we may still have U (s) < U (s0 ), and thus, it is possible that the
user will prefer s.
If the differences V (s) − U (s) and V (s0 ) − U (s0 ) are small, then for V (s) À
V (s0 ), we can be reasonably sure that U (s) > U (s0 ) and thus, that the user will
select s. Similarly, if V (s) ¿ V (s0 ), we can be reasonably sure that U (s) < U (s0 )
and thus, that the user will select s0 . However, when the values V (s) and V (s0 )
are close, then there is a certain probability that U (s) > U (s0 ) and thus, that
the user will select s, and there is also a certain probability that U (s) < U (s0 )
and thus, that the user will select s0 .
In this situation, based on the (approximate) utility values V (s) and V (s0 ),
we cannot exactly predict whether the user will prefer s or s0 – because for the
same values of V (s) and V (s0 ), the user can prefer s and the user can also prefer
s0 . The best we can do in this situation is to predict the probability P (s > s0 )
of selecting s over s0 .

2

Discrete choice: a formal description of the problem. Let us formulate
the problem in precise terms. We have n different alternatives s1 , . . . , sn . For
def
each of these alternative si , we know the (approximate) utility value Vi = V (si ).
Based on these utility values V (s1 ), . . . , V (sn ), we would like to predict the
probability pi that a user will select the alternative si .
Models used for such prediction are usually called discrete choice models
[11].
Invariance requirements in discrete choice models. As we have mentioned, the utility function is not uniquely determined by the preference relation.
Namely, whenever the original utility function U (s) describes the user’s preference, then, for every a > 0 and b, the new function U 0 (s) = a · U (s) + b
also describes the same preference. In other words, we can shift all the values of the utility function u(s) → U (s) + b, and we can re-scale all the values
U (s) → a · u(s), and the resulting utility function will still describe the same
preferences.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that if we shift the values of the approximate utility function, i.e., if we replace the original values V (si ) with the new
values V 0 (si ) = V (si ) + b, then we should get the same preference probabilities:
pi (V (s1 ), V (s2 ) . . . , V (sn )) = pi (V (s1 ) + b, V (s2 ) + b, . . . , V (sn ) + b).
In particular, if we take b = −V (s1 ), then we conclude that
pi (V (s1 ), V (s2 ) . . . , V (sn )) = pi (0, V (s2 ) − V (s1 ), . . . , V (sn ) − V (s1 )),
i.e., that the probabilities depend only on the differences between the utility
values – but not on the values themselves.
At first glance, it may seem reasonable to similarly require that the probability not change under re-scaling. However, in this case, re-scaling does not
make intuitive sense, because we have a natural scale. For example, as a unit for
such a scale, we can choose a standard deviation of the difference U (s) − V (s)
between the (unknown) actual utility U (s) and the (known) approximate value
of this utility V (s).
In line with this analysis, in discrete choice models, it is usually assumed
that the probabilities do not change with shift but it is not assumed that these
probabilities are scale-invariant.
Logit: the most widely used discrete choice model. The most widely
used discrete choice model is a logit model in which
eβ·Vi
pi (V1 , . . . , Vn ) = P
n
eβ·Vj
j=1

for some parameter β. This model was first proposes in [6].
3

(1)

Logit: original justification. In Luce [6], this model was justified based on
the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, according to which
the relative probability of selecting s1 or s2 should not change if we add a third
alternative s3 . In formal terms, this means that the probability of selecting s1
out of two alternatives s1 and s2 should be equal to the conditional probability
of selecting s1 from three alternatives s1 , s2 , and s3 under the condition that
either s1 or s2 are selected.
It can be proven that under this assumption, the ratio pi /pj of the probabilities pi and pj should only depend on Vi and Vj ; moreover, that we must have
pi /pj = f (Vi )/f (Vj ) for some function f (z). The requirement that this ratio be
shift-invariant then leads to the conclusion that f (z) = eβ·z for some β – and
thus, to the logit model.
Limitations of the original justification. At first glance, the above independence assumption sounds reasonable (and it is often reasonable). However,
there are reasonable situations where this assumption is counter-intuitive; see,
e.g., Chipman [2], Debreu [3], Train [11].
For example, assume that in some cities, all the buses were originally blue.
To get from point A to point B, a user can choose between taking a taxi (s1 )
and taking a blue bus (s2 ). A taxi is somewhat better to this user, so he selects
a taxi with probability p1 = 0.6 and a blue bus with the remaining probability
p2 = 1 − 0.6 = 0.4. In this case, the ratio p1 /p2 is equal to 1.5.
Suppose now that the city decided to buy some new buses, and to paint
them red. Let us also suppose that the comfort of the travel did not change,
the buses are exactly the same. From the common sense viewpoint, it does not
matter to the user whether buses are blue or red, so he should still select a taxi
with probability p1 = 0.6 and buses with probability 0.4. However, from the
purely mathematical viewpoint, we now have three options: taking a taxi (s1 ),
taking a blue bus (s2 ), and taking a red bus (s3 ). Here, the probability of taking
a bus is now p2 + p3 = 0.4. Hence, p2 < 0.4 and so, the ratio p1 /p2 is different
from what we had before – contrary to the above independence assumption.
Current justification. An alternative justification for logit started with the
unpublished result of Marley first cited in Luce and Suppes [7]. Marley has
def

shown that if we assume that the approximation errors ε(s) = U (s) − V (s) are
independent and identically distributed, and if this distribution is the Gumbel
distrubution, then the probability of selecting si indeed follows the logit formula.
Gumbel distribution can be characterized by the cumulative distribution
−ε
function F (ε) = e−e ; it is a known distribution of extreme values.
In 1974, McFadden [8] showed that, vice versa, if we assumed that the approximation errors ε(s) are independent and identically distributed, and the
choice probabilities are described by the logit formula, then the errors ε(s)
must follow the extreme value (Gumbel) distribution.
This justification was one of the main achievements for which D. McFadden
received a Nobel prize in 2001 [9].
4

Limitations of the current justification. The problem with this justification is that the logit model is known to work well even in the cases when
different approximation errors are differently distributed; see, e.g., Train [11].
For such situations, the only known alternative explanation is Luce’s original one. The main limitation of this explanation was that it is based on the
independence assumption. This is not so critical if we have three or more alternatives. Indeed, in this case, the empirical logit formula (that we are trying to
explain) satisfies this assumption, so making this assumption in the situations
when the logit formula holds makes sense.
This limitation, however, becomes crucial if we only consider the case of
two alternatives. In this case, the independence assumption cannot even be
formulated and therefore, Luce’s justification does not apply. So, we arrive at
the following problem.
Formulation of the problem. We need to come up with a new distributionfree justification for the logit formula, i.e., with a justification that does not
depend on the assumption that approximation errors are independent and identically distributed. Such a justification is provided in this paper.

2

Preliminary Analysis

In accordance with the above formulation of the problem, we are interested in
the case of n = 2 alternatives s1 and s2 . We know the approximate utility values
V1 and V2 , and we know that the probability p1 of selecting the first alternative
p1 should only depend on the difference V1 − V2 : p1 = F (V1 − V2 ) for some
function F (z). Our objective is to find this function F (z). Let us first describe
reasonable properties of this function F (z).
When s2 is fixed (hence V2 is fixed) but the alternative s1 is improving
(i.e., V1 is increasing), then the probability of selecting s1 can only increase (or
at least remain the same – e.g., if that probability was already equal to 1, it
cannot further increase). In other words, as the difference V1 − V2 increases, the
probability p1 = F (V1 − V2 ) should also increase (or at least remain the same).
Thus, it is reasonable to require that the function F (z) should be (non-strictly)
increasing.
When s2 and V2 are fixed and s1 becomes better and better, i.e., V1 →
+∞, then we should select s1 with probability tending to 1. So, we must have
F (z) → 1 as z → +∞.
Similarly, s2 and V2 are fixed, and s1 becomes worse and worse, i.e., V1 −V2 →
−∞, then we should prefer s2 . So, we must have F (z) → 0 as z → −∞.
Since we only have two alternatives, the probability p1 = F (V1 − V2 ) and
the probability p2 = F (V2 − V1 ) must always add up to 1. Thus, we must have
F (z) + F (−z) = 1 for all z.
So, we arrive at the following definition.
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Definition 1 By a choice function, we mean a function F : R → [0, 1] which
is (non-strictly) increasing, and for which F (z) → 1 as z → +∞, F (z) → 0 as
z → −∞, and F (z) + F (−z) = 1 for all z.

3

Main Idea

Our main idea is as follows. Up to now, we have discussed how to describe
the user’s behavior, but often, the ultimate objective is how to modify this
behavior. For example, in transportation problems, the goal is often to use
public transportation to relieve traffic congestion and related pollution. In this
case, the problem is not just to estimate the probability of people using public
transportation, but to find out how to increase this probability.
One way to increase this probability is to provide incentives. If we want
to encourage people to prefer alternative s1 , then we can provide those who
select this alternative with an additional benefit of value v0 . In this case, for
alternatives si 6= s1 , the corresponding utility Vi remains the same, but for the
alternative s1 , we have a new value of utility V10 = V1 + v0 .
After this addition, the original probability
p1 = F (V1 − V2 )

(2)

of selecting the alternative s1 changes to a new value
p01 = F (V10 − V2 ) = F (V1 + v0 − V2 ).

(3)

These formulas can be simplified if we denote the difference V1 − V2 between
the approximate utility values by ∆V . In these new notations, the original
probability
p1 = F (∆V )
(4)
is replaced by the new probability
p01 = F (∆V + v0 ).

(5)

This change of probability can be described in general terms: we receive new
information – that there are now incentives. Based on this new information, we
update our original probabilities pi of selecting different alternatives si .
From the statistical viewpoint (see, e.g., [4, 12]), when we receive new information, the correct way of updating probabilities is by using the Bayes formula.
Specifically, if we have n incompatible hypotheses H1 , . . . , Hn with initial probabilities
P0 (H1 ), . . . , P0 (Hn ),
(6)
then, after observations E, we update the initial probabilities to the new values:
P (Hi | E) =

P (E | Hi ) · P0 (Hi )
.
P (E | H1 ) · P0 (H1 ) + . . . + P (E | Hn ) · P0 (Hn )

(7)

Thus, we should require that the function F (z) be such for which the transition
from the old probability (4) to the new probability (5) can be described by the
(fractionally linear) Bayes formula (7).
6

4

From the Main Idea to the Exact Formulas

Let us formalize the above requirement. In the case of two alternatives s1 and
s2 , we have two hypotheses: the hypothesis H1 that the user will prefer s1 and
the opposite hypothesis H2 that the user will prefer s2 . Initially, we did now
know about any incentives, we only knew the approximate utility V1 of the first
alternative and the approximate utility V2 of the second alternative. Based on
the information that we initially had, we concluded that the probability of the
hypothesis H1 is equal to p1 = p(H1 ) = F (∆V ) (where ∆V = V1 − V2 ), and the
probability of the opposite hypothesis H2 is equal to p2 = p(H2 ) = 1 − p1 .
Now, suppose that learn that there was no incentive to select alternative
s2 and an incentive of size v0 to select alternative s1 . This new information
E changes the probabilities of our hypotheses H1 and H2 . Namely, according
to Bayes formula, after the new information E, the probability p1 should be
updated to the following new value p01 = P (H1 | E):
p01 =

P (E | H1 ) · P (H1 )
.
P (E | H1 ) · p1 + P (E | H2 ) · P (H2 )

(8)

The probability P (E | H1 ) is the conditional probability with which we can
conclude that there was an incentive of size v0 based on the fact that the user
actually selected the alternative s1 . This conditional probability is, in general,
different for different values v0 . To take this dependence into account, we will
denote this conditional probability P (E | H1 ) by A(v0 ).
Similarly, the probability P (E | H2 ) is the conditional probability with which
we can conclude that there was an incentive of size v0 for alternative s1 based
on the fact that the user actually selected the alternative s2 . This conditional
probability is also, in general, different for different values v0 . To take this
dependence into account, we will denote this conditional probability P (E | H2 )
by B(v0 ).
If we substitute the expressions P (E | H1 ) = A(v0 ), P (E | H2 ) = B(v0 ),
P (H1 ) = F (∆V ), and P (H2 ) = 1 − P (H1 ) = 1 − F (∆V ) into the above formula
(8), then we conclude that
p01 =

A(v0 ) · F (∆V )
.
A(v0 ) · F (∆V ) + B(v0 ) · (1 − F (∆V ))

(9)

On the other hand, once we know that there was an incentive v0 to select the
alternative s1 and no incentive for the alternative s2 , then we have a better idea
of the resulting utilities of the user: namely, the new value of the approximate
utility is V1 + v0 for alternative s1 and V2 for the alternative s2 . In accordance
with our expression for the choice probability based on the approximate utility
values, the new probability of selecting s1 should be equal to F ((V1 + v0 ) − V2 ),
i.e., to F (∆V + v0 ) (expression (4)).
If the probability update was done correctly, in full accordance with the
Bayes formula, then this new value (4) must be equal to the value (9) that
comes from using the Bayes formula. So, we arrive at the following definition:
7

Definition 2 A choice function F (z) is called Bayes correct if, for every v0 ,
there exist values A(v0 ) and B(v0 ) for which
F (∆V + v0 ) =

A(v0 ) · F (∆V )
A(v0 ) · F (∆V ) + B(v0 ) · (1 − F (∆V ))

(10)

for all ∆V .
Comment.½ In other words,
¾ we require that the 2-parametric family of
A · F (∆V )
corresponding to Bayesian updates be shiftfunctions F =
A · F (∆V ) + B
invariant under a shift ∆V → ∆V + v0 .

5

Main Result

Theorem 1 Every Bayes correct choice function F (z) has the form
F (∆V ) =

1
1 + e−β·∆V

(11)

for some real number β.
If we substitute ∆V = V1 −V2 into this formula, and multiply the numerator
and the denominator of the resulting formula by eβ·V1 , then we conclude that
for every Bayes correct choice function F (z), we have
p1 = F (V1 − V2 ) =

eβ·V1
.
+ eβ·V2

eβ·V1

(12)

Thus, for the desired case of two alternatives, we indeed provide a new distributionfree justification of the logit formula.

6

Proof

It is known that many formulas in probability theory can be simplified if instead
of the probability p, we consider the corresponding odds
O=

p
.
1−p

(13)

(If we know the odds O, then we can reconstruct the probability p as p =
O/(1 + O).) The right-hand side of the formula (10) can be represented in
terms of odds O(∆V ), if we divide both the numerator and the denominators
by 1 − F (∆V ). As a result, we get the following formula:
F (∆V + v0 ) =

A(v0 ) · O(∆V )
.
A(v0 ) · O(∆V ) + B(v0 )
8

(14)

Based on this formula, we can compute the corresponding odds O(∆V + v0 ):
first, we compute the value
1 − F (∆V + v0 ) =

B(v0 )
,
A(v0 ) · O(∆V ) + B(v0 )

(15)

and then divide (14) by (15), resulting in:
O(∆V + v0 ) = c(v0 ) · O(∆V ),

(16)

def

where we denoted c(v0 ) = A(v0 )/B(v0 ). It is known (see, e.g., [1]) that all
monotonic solutions of the functional equation (16) are of the form O(∆V ) =
C · eβ·∆V . Therefore, we can reconstruct the probability F (∆V ) as
F (∆V ) =

C · eβ·∆V
O(∆V )
=
.
O(∆V ) + 1
C · eβ·∆V + 1

(17)

The condition F (z) + F (−z) = 1 leads to C = 1. Dividing both the numerator
and the denominator of the right-hand side by eβ·∆V , we get the desired formula
(11). Q.E.D.
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